Monday, July 4, 2011
Viewsonic VX910 Capacitor Replacment Update
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
A Greek Tragedy
It really didn't have to turn out like this. After a couple of years the internal discussions will leak out, and we'll get a better sense of why the current government led by (and consisting entirely of) the Greek Socialist Party pushed these draconian neoliberal reforms (liberal as in as in classical liberal, not American librulz) on the country. The only justifiable reason I see is that the leadership of the party thinks that they can't pull off a switch to a "new Drachma" because it would be impossible to keep it a secret long enough to implement the change successfully. But I don't believe that will turn out to be the real reason, or at least the main one.
Update 2011.06.30: An article from the BBC explains why Greece can't default as long as it continues to use the Euro. As long as the primary budget - the budget minus interest payments - is unbalanced, default is not possible because the Greek government is depending on more loans of Euros to pay its employees and vendors for the foreseeable future. The neoliberal economic organizations that are pushing the austerity package on Greece in exchange for the loans are projecting sufficient positive economic growth to bring the budget into surplus, when coupled with spending cutbacks. But as we've seen in the UK, cutting government spending (demand) when there is insufficient private demand to make up for the cuts leads to economic contraction. It's a vicious circle: cuts lead to slowdown which reduces revenue which increases the deficit which leads to more cuts. So the latest package just another kick at the can.
Update 2011.06.30: An article from the BBC explains why Greece can't default as long as it continues to use the Euro. As long as the primary budget - the budget minus interest payments - is unbalanced, default is not possible because the Greek government is depending on more loans of Euros to pay its employees and vendors for the foreseeable future. The neoliberal economic organizations that are pushing the austerity package on Greece in exchange for the loans are projecting sufficient positive economic growth to bring the budget into surplus, when coupled with spending cutbacks. But as we've seen in the UK, cutting government spending (demand) when there is insufficient private demand to make up for the cuts leads to economic contraction. It's a vicious circle: cuts lead to slowdown which reduces revenue which increases the deficit which leads to more cuts. So the latest package just another kick at the can.
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Take This Job And Add It To Your To-do List
Via a plug post by Drum comes this article from Mother Jones, entitled The Great Speedup, on how employers are squeezing the employees they haven't fired to do more work. It covers two topics I've touched on before: the much greater number of hours Americans spend working, and the lack of worker protections that enables employers to put the screws to employees. Lots of people forget (and lots of people work to make them forget) that the point of economic activity is allow people to live their lives, which includes the non-economically productive portion. The point of economic activity is most definitely not to create impressive numbers on corporate reports, even though the business news channels say otherwise. It really doesn't matter if corporate America is setting record profits if there is chronically high unemployment and under-employment. That contrast means that something is amiss in how economic activity is structured right now in this country. Keep in mind that the differences between the US and other countries are due to conscious policy choices, even if few people are aware of when choices are being made for them.
Monday, June 20, 2011
Take This Debt and Shove It
In response to this article about the crisis in Greece, recovering economist Atrios wonders why the Greeks don't default on the huge amount of government debt that the country will never be able to (entirely) repay. The answer is (probably, I can't read the minds of Greek politicians) that there are competing interests in every country. It's safe to say that Greek politicians and the Greek elites (whoever
they are) haven't been acting in the people's interest over the past
decade, given the bookkeeping fraud and tax evasion perpetrated by the
two groups. So, for some reason the Greek politicians must not see it in their interest to default, or at least default right now. They may change their minds due to factors like being threatened by rioters, or finishing the transfer of their assets to Malta.
In general I remain a bit surprised at just how much the ECB is being run in the interests of Germany and the other core countries (NL, FR, and perhaps BE). That's been happening for months now. As bad as unemployment is here in the US, it is much worse in Spain and other countries at the periphery of the Eurozone.
Update 2011.06.23: Krugman summarizes the case for default in one handy graph. Greece is not Argentina, of course, and global economic conditions are quite different now compared to 2002. But the outcome for the Greek people is guaranteed to be better than suffering through years of austerity-induced economic contraction.
In general I remain a bit surprised at just how much the ECB is being run in the interests of Germany and the other core countries (NL, FR, and perhaps BE). That's been happening for months now. As bad as unemployment is here in the US, it is much worse in Spain and other countries at the periphery of the Eurozone.
Update 2011.06.23: Krugman summarizes the case for default in one handy graph. Greece is not Argentina, of course, and global economic conditions are quite different now compared to 2002. But the outcome for the Greek people is guaranteed to be better than suffering through years of austerity-induced economic contraction.
Saturday, June 4, 2011
Could Small Be Beautiful?
When I was compiling my list of reactors being marketed as of early 2011, I ignored a number of small designs that I felt were unlikely to be built. There are more than a few such proposals, with many of them coming from various state-owned design bureaus in Russia. During the early days of nuclear power, in the 1950s and 1960s, various national governments put money into building small reactors of interesting designs. Some of those include Hallam, Piqua, Fort St. Vrain, Niederaichbach, Jülich, and the Steam-Generating Heavy Water Reactor. None of these worked well enough to be cost-effective, and the nuclear power industry has come to be dominated by large light water reactors.
More recently, governments have been supporting research and development of small reactors, but only two examples of one model from Russia have been built. Some private corporations are also working on new reactor designs with their own funds, but none have completed licensing. Generically, these new designs are called SMRs, which stands either for small modular reactors or, less often, small and medium reactors. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines small reactors as less than 300 MWe, and medium reactors as 300-700 MWe. The word modular refers to how proponents see these reactors as being deployed, which would be at power plants with 4 to 20 units.
The main appeal of these reactors is the capital cost of any one of them. Large nuclear reactors have a long history of enormous cost overruns on the initial estimates, which are also enormous. The 1600 MWe European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) currently being built at Olkiluoto in Finland was sold as a turnkey contract for €3.3B, but cost overruns have pushed the price to over €6B - so far. SMR proponents are projecting costs of their reactors from $50M to $1B, depending on the design. But almost all of the designs haven't reached the final detailed design stage, so it is possible (and quite likely) that the estimates could turn out to be as wrong as ones for large reactors. However, even if the estimates are wrong, the smaller reactors would be less risky for utilities to build because an overrun with any one reactor wouldn't threaten to bankrupt the company.
According to proponents, there are several other positive aspects to SMRs, though they don't all have the same ones. For most, the smaller size would allow large sections to be mass manufactured off-site in controlled factory conditions, with only final assembly done on site. This has the potential (in theory) to improve quality assurance over large reactors, which are largely custom built on-site of essentially one-off parts. Some designs are small enough that they would be delivered as pre-fueled packages and then sent back to the factor when the fuel is exhausted. That could significantly reduce the amount of waste generated at the power plant site, eliminate complicated on-site refueling operations, and potentially reduce the chances of fuel theft or proliferation. It would not eliminate the chance of accidents or theft during transit, however, though the latter would be difficult. Most of the designs call for the reactors to be housed underground, which basically eliminates the chance of damage from missiles or airplanes. However, the crisis at Fukushima Dai-ichi has shown that backup systems can be critical. Some of the new designs still require active cooling by a backup system after shutdown, and most leave these systems exposed. Finally, depending on the size, some of the new reactors could be deployed in rural or remote locations where only a moderate amount of power is needed and a large reactor would overwhelm the local grid.
The main question about these designs is whether or not they would, when deployed en mass, end up being safer. Clearly, if there was an accident with any one reactor, it would make less of a mess than a larger reactor would. But I doubt whether 1000 reactors each of 100 MWe would be monitored and inspected as carefully as a set of 100 reactors of 1000 MWe. That means each small reactor deployed has to have a radically lower probability of having its containment breached to make up for poorer monitoring and greater numbers. Some of the designs may actually be that much safer, but until a plant goes through a rigorous licensing process, we have no way of knowing how good any of them are.
Most of the reactors listed below were pulled from two documents from the IAEA (1, 2), with others coming from Wikipedia or general web surfing. Because there are so many of them, I may have missed a few. I've classified some reactors as "abandoned" in the status field if I was unable to find them on the originating organization's website, though the lack of public information doesn't necessarily mean a project has been ended. The converse is true as well.
By neutron speed, there are:
By major type, there are:
Note: I'll probably edit this post frequently as I find more information.
Added 2011/06/08: The Union of Concerned Scientists has provided some testimony to Congress on SMRs.
More recently, governments have been supporting research and development of small reactors, but only two examples of one model from Russia have been built. Some private corporations are also working on new reactor designs with their own funds, but none have completed licensing. Generically, these new designs are called SMRs, which stands either for small modular reactors or, less often, small and medium reactors. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines small reactors as less than 300 MWe, and medium reactors as 300-700 MWe. The word modular refers to how proponents see these reactors as being deployed, which would be at power plants with 4 to 20 units.
The main appeal of these reactors is the capital cost of any one of them. Large nuclear reactors have a long history of enormous cost overruns on the initial estimates, which are also enormous. The 1600 MWe European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) currently being built at Olkiluoto in Finland was sold as a turnkey contract for €3.3B, but cost overruns have pushed the price to over €6B - so far. SMR proponents are projecting costs of their reactors from $50M to $1B, depending on the design. But almost all of the designs haven't reached the final detailed design stage, so it is possible (and quite likely) that the estimates could turn out to be as wrong as ones for large reactors. However, even if the estimates are wrong, the smaller reactors would be less risky for utilities to build because an overrun with any one reactor wouldn't threaten to bankrupt the company.
According to proponents, there are several other positive aspects to SMRs, though they don't all have the same ones. For most, the smaller size would allow large sections to be mass manufactured off-site in controlled factory conditions, with only final assembly done on site. This has the potential (in theory) to improve quality assurance over large reactors, which are largely custom built on-site of essentially one-off parts. Some designs are small enough that they would be delivered as pre-fueled packages and then sent back to the factor when the fuel is exhausted. That could significantly reduce the amount of waste generated at the power plant site, eliminate complicated on-site refueling operations, and potentially reduce the chances of fuel theft or proliferation. It would not eliminate the chance of accidents or theft during transit, however, though the latter would be difficult. Most of the designs call for the reactors to be housed underground, which basically eliminates the chance of damage from missiles or airplanes. However, the crisis at Fukushima Dai-ichi has shown that backup systems can be critical. Some of the new designs still require active cooling by a backup system after shutdown, and most leave these systems exposed. Finally, depending on the size, some of the new reactors could be deployed in rural or remote locations where only a moderate amount of power is needed and a large reactor would overwhelm the local grid.
The main question about these designs is whether or not they would, when deployed en mass, end up being safer. Clearly, if there was an accident with any one reactor, it would make less of a mess than a larger reactor would. But I doubt whether 1000 reactors each of 100 MWe would be monitored and inspected as carefully as a set of 100 reactors of 1000 MWe. That means each small reactor deployed has to have a radically lower probability of having its containment breached to make up for poorer monitoring and greater numbers. Some of the designs may actually be that much safer, but until a plant goes through a rigorous licensing process, we have no way of knowing how good any of them are.
Most of the reactors listed below were pulled from two documents from the IAEA (1, 2), with others coming from Wikipedia or general web surfing. Because there are so many of them, I may have missed a few. I've classified some reactors as "abandoned" in the status field if I was unable to find them on the originating organization's website, though the lack of public information doesn't necessarily mean a project has been ended. The converse is true as well.
By neutron speed, there are:
By major type, there are:
- 14 pressurized water reactors (PWR)
- 13 lead-cooled fast reactors (LMFR or LFR)
- 10 light water reactors (LWR - light water reactors that are not typical BWRs or PWRs)
- 8 sodium-cooled fast reactors (LMFR or SFR)
- 6 high temperature gas-cooled reactors (GCR or HTGR)
- 4 boiling water reactors (BWR)
- 2 molten salt-cooled reactors (? - no common acronym)
- 2 gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR)
- 2 lead-bismuth-cooled fast reactor (LMFR or LFR)
- 1 lithium-cooled fast reactor (? - no common acronym)
- 1 heavy water-moderated pressurized water reactor (HWBWR)
- 1 molten salt reactor (MSR)
| Reactor | Type | MWt | MWe | Country | Company | Status | Refuelling |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4S | Sodium-cooled fast reactor | 30 | 10 | Japan | Toshiba Power Systems | US pre-licensing | factory |
| 4S-LMR | Sodium-cooled fast reactor | 135 | 50 | Japan | CRIEPI | concept | factory |
| ABV-6 | Pressurized water reactor | 60 | 12 | Russia | OKBM | concept | on-site |
| ACACIA | High temperature gas-cooled reactor | 60 | 23 | Netherlands | NRG | abandoned | on-site |
| AFPR-100 | Light water reactor | 300 | 100 | USA | PNNL | abandoned | factory |
| AFR-300 | Sodium-cooled fast reactor | 800 | 300 | USA | ANL | concept | on-site |
| AHTR | Molten salt-cooled reactor | 600 | 300 | USA | ORNL / UCB | concept | on-site |
| AHWR | heavy water-moderated boiling water reactor | 260 | 100 | India | NPCIL | detailed design | on-site |
| ARC-100 | Sodium-cooled fast reactor | 920 | 300 | USA | Advanced Reactor Concepts | concept | on-site |
| BGR-300 | Gas-cooled fast reactor | 300 | 130 | Russia | RRC Kurchatov | concept | factory |
| BMN-170 | Sodium-cooled fast reactor | 400 | 170 | Russia | OKBM | abandoned | on-site |
| BN GT-300 | Sodium-cooled fast reactor | 730 | 300 | Russia | IPPE | concept | on-site |
| BREST | Lead-cooled fast reactor | ? | 300 | Russia | NIKIET | concept | on-site |
| CAREM | Light water reactor | 100 | 27 | Argentina | INVAP / CNEA | Argentina pre-licensing | on-site |
| CCR | Boiling water reactor | 900 | 300 | Japan | Toshiba Power Systems | abandoned | on-site |
| CHTR | Lead-buismuth-cooled fast reactor | 0.1 | 0.02 | India | BARC | concept | factory |
| DRX | Pressurized water reactor | 0.75 | 0.15 | Japan | JAERI | abandoned | on-site |
| ELENA NTEP | Light water reactor | 3.3 | 0.07 | Russia | RRC Kurchatov | abandoned | factory |
| EM2 | Gas-cooled fast reactor | 500 | 240 | USA | General Atomics | concept | factory |
| ENHS | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 125 | 50 | USA | LLNL / UCB | concept | factory |
| FBNR | Pressurized water reactor | 134 | 40 | Brazil | FURGS | concept | factory |
| GT-MHR | High temperature gas-cooled reactor | 600 | 287 | USA | General Atomics | concept | on-site |
| GTHTR-300 | High temperature gas-cooled reactor | 600 | 274 | Japan | JAERI | abandoned | on-site |
| HTGR | High temperature gas-cooled reactor | 220 | 100 | Japan | First Atomic Power Industry Group | concept | on-site |
| HTR-PM | High temperature gas-cooled reactor | 380 | 160 | China | CNNC | prototype construction | on-site |
| IRIS | Pressurized water reactor | ? | 335 | USA | Westinghouse (Toshiba) | US pre-licensing | on-site |
| ISIS | Pressurized water reactor | 650 | 200 | Italy | Ansaldo Nucleare | abandoned | on-site |
| KALIMER | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 392 | 150 | Korea | KAERI | concept | on-site |
| KAMADO | Light water reactor | 1000 | 300 | Japan | CRIEPI | abandoned | on-site |
| KLT-40S | Pressurized water reactor | 150 | 35 | Russia | OKBM/ Atomstroyexport | production | on-site |
| LSPR | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 150 | 53 | Japan | RLNR-TIT | abandoned | factory |
| MARS | Molten salt-cooled reactor | 16 | 6 | Russia | RRC Kurchatov | abandoned | factory |
| MARS | Pressurized water reactor | 600 | 150 | Italy | U. of Rome / ENEA | abandoned | on-site |
| MASLWR | Pressurized water reactor | 150 | 45 | USA | NuScale | US pre-licensing | factory |
| MBRU-12 | Sodium-cooled fast reactor | 48 | 12 | Russia | OKBM | abandoned | factory |
| MDP | Sodium-cooled fast reactor | 840 | 325 | Japan | CRIEPI | abandoned | on-site |
| mPower | Pressurized water reactor | 400 | 125 | USA | Babcock & Wilcox | US pre-licensing | on-site |
| MRX | Pressurized water reactor | 100 | Japan | JAERI | abandoned | on-site | |
| MSBWR | Boiling water reactor | ? | 50 | USA | GE / Purdue | abandoned | on-site |
| MSR-FUJI | Molten salt reactor | 450 | 200 | Japan | ITHMSI | concept | continuous |
| NP-300 | Pressurized water reactor | ? | 300 | France | Areva NP | abandoned | on-site |
| Package Reactor | Light water reactor | 25 | ? | Japan | Hitachi / Mitsubishi | abandoned | on-site |
| PBMR | High temperature gas-cooled reactor | 400 | 165 | South Africa | PBMR (ESKOM) | abandoned after starting US pre-licensing | on-site |
| PEACER-300 | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 850 | 300 | Korea | Seoul Nat. U. | concept | on-site |
| PFPWR-50 | Light water reactor | 50 | n/a | Japan | Hokkaido U. | concept | factory |
| Power Module | Lead-bismuth-cooled fast reactor | 75 | 25 | USA | Hyperion Power Generation | US pre-licensing | factory |
| PRISM | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 840 | 311 | USA | GE-Hitachi | US pre-licensing | on-site |
| PSRD | Light water reactor | 100 | 31 | Japan | JAEA | concept | factory |
| PWBWR | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 450 | 150 | Japan | RLNR-TIT | abandoned | on-site |
| RAPID | Lithium-cooled fast reactor | 10 | 1.2 | Japan | CRIEPI | abandoned | factory |
| RBEC-M | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 900 | 340 | Russia | RRC Kurchatov | abandoned | on-site |
| RMWR | Boiling water reactor | 955 | 330 | Japan | Hitachi / JAERI | concept | on-site |
| RUTA-70 | Light water reactor | 70 | n/a | Russia | NIKIET / IPPE | concept | on-site |
| SMART | Pressurized water reactor | 330 | 90 | Korea | KAERI | Korea license | on-site |
| SPINNOR | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 55 | 20 | Indonesia | ITB | concept | factory |
| SSTAR | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 45 | 20 | USA | ANL / LLNL / LANL / INL / UCB | concept | factory |
| STAR-H2 | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 400 | n/a | USA | ANL / OrSU / TA&M / OhSU | concept | factory |
| STAR-LM | Lead-bismuth-cooled fast reactor | 400 | 178 | USA | ANL | concept | factory |
| SVBR-75/100 | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 280 | 100 | Russia | IPPE / OKB Gidropress | concept | factory |
| TPS | Light water reactor | 64 | 16 | USA | General Atomics | abandoned | on-site |
| UNITHERM | Pressurized water reactor | 20 | 7 | Russia | NIKIET | concept | factory |
| V-SPINNOR | Lead-cooled fast reactor | 17 | 6 | Indonesia | ITB | concept | factory |
| VBER-300 | Pressurized water reactor | 850 | 295 | Russia | OKBM | concept | on-site |
| VK-300 | Boiling water reactor | 750 | 250 | Russia | NIKIET | concept | on-site |
| VKR-MT | Light water reactor | 890 | 300 | Russia | RRC Kurchatov | abandoned | factory |
Note: I'll probably edit this post frequently as I find more information.
Added 2011/06/08: The Union of Concerned Scientists has provided some testimony to Congress on SMRs.
Sunday, May 29, 2011
Having A Nuclear Blast
This is an entirely expected development. The current storm may well miss the Fukushima area, but at some point this hurricane season a part of a storm will move across it. TEPCO has been spraying the grounds of Fukushima Dai-ichi with a resin that should, if it operates as claimed, reduce the amount of radioactive material transported by the wind and rain. It probably works okay in a normal rain, but even cyclones that are only tropical storms can bring very heavy rainfall to an area. It won't matter if the surface is sealed when large sections of ground are washed away, as happened on Thursday night here in Vermont.
Another issue of concern is the structural integrity of the unit 4 containment building, which seems to be leaning to the right a bit. If it is seriously compromised, a big wind gust could create a crack in the spent fuel pool. TEPCO announced that it had started shoring up the structure on May 9, but I am unaware of further updates on that matter. Earlier speculation that the fuel pool had drained due damage was wrong, fortunately, but it could still happen.
On top of the existing technical problems at the site is this little incident (which will probably be resolved in a few hours, but still).
The most significant development in the Fukushima crisis over the past few weeks is the revelation from TEPCO that the fuel in units 1-3 melted down shortly after the quake and (and!) they knew it, at least for unit 1. Given that pattern of lying, and the Japanese government's servile attitude towards TEPCO, I think it's advisable to heavily discount anything they say.
Finally, this presentation by Arnie Gundersen for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards is very important for everyone to see, despite a few technical annoyances. It wasn't until a few weeks ago when he first mentioned it that I realized that the NRC assumed that there was zero probability (0.0%) that the containment structure at a nuclear reactor could fail. Containment isn't the reactor pressure vessel; failure is assumed for that, even if the probability is low. Instead, it is the larger structure built around the reactor pressure vessel. For PWRs, it is usually the entire volume of a large, circular concrete building with a domed top. For BWRs, it is usually a substructure within a large, square building, just like the ones at Fukushima. (There are exceptions to each, of course, and other types of reactors, but not in the US.) Gundersen has documented several instances where there were cracks or other penetrations in the containment at US reactors. Now, in the first real-world tests of the GE BWR Mark I containment design, there has been 100% failure. Three out of the three units that were online at Fukushima immediately prior to the earthquake and tsunami are compromised. Those results should cause the NRC put any action such as license renewal or power up-rates for the 23 operating Mk.I reactors in the US on hold until what happened at Fukushima is fully analyzed and any lessons extracted. That is unlikely to happen, unfortunately. We seem to be living in a post-fact world, where only money and power can change people's minds. The ACRS is likely to blow off Gundersen, as they have before.
ETA: Just after posting I found a report saying cooling has been restored.
Added 2011/06/01: Shoring up the unit 4 spent fuel pool started on 05/23 according to this article.
Another issue of concern is the structural integrity of the unit 4 containment building, which seems to be leaning to the right a bit. If it is seriously compromised, a big wind gust could create a crack in the spent fuel pool. TEPCO announced that it had started shoring up the structure on May 9, but I am unaware of further updates on that matter. Earlier speculation that the fuel pool had drained due damage was wrong, fortunately, but it could still happen.
On top of the existing technical problems at the site is this little incident (which will probably be resolved in a few hours, but still).
The most significant development in the Fukushima crisis over the past few weeks is the revelation from TEPCO that the fuel in units 1-3 melted down shortly after the quake and (and!) they knew it, at least for unit 1. Given that pattern of lying, and the Japanese government's servile attitude towards TEPCO, I think it's advisable to heavily discount anything they say.
Finally, this presentation by Arnie Gundersen for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards is very important for everyone to see, despite a few technical annoyances. It wasn't until a few weeks ago when he first mentioned it that I realized that the NRC assumed that there was zero probability (0.0%) that the containment structure at a nuclear reactor could fail. Containment isn't the reactor pressure vessel; failure is assumed for that, even if the probability is low. Instead, it is the larger structure built around the reactor pressure vessel. For PWRs, it is usually the entire volume of a large, circular concrete building with a domed top. For BWRs, it is usually a substructure within a large, square building, just like the ones at Fukushima. (There are exceptions to each, of course, and other types of reactors, but not in the US.) Gundersen has documented several instances where there were cracks or other penetrations in the containment at US reactors. Now, in the first real-world tests of the GE BWR Mark I containment design, there has been 100% failure. Three out of the three units that were online at Fukushima immediately prior to the earthquake and tsunami are compromised. Those results should cause the NRC put any action such as license renewal or power up-rates for the 23 operating Mk.I reactors in the US on hold until what happened at Fukushima is fully analyzed and any lessons extracted. That is unlikely to happen, unfortunately. We seem to be living in a post-fact world, where only money and power can change people's minds. The ACRS is likely to blow off Gundersen, as they have before.
ETA: Just after posting I found a report saying cooling has been restored.
Added 2011/06/01: Shoring up the unit 4 spent fuel pool started on 05/23 according to this article.
Saturday, May 28, 2011
Completed Insanity
A while ago I started a project to redraw the counties of California. This morning, for no reason I can discern, I suddenly had the urge to complete the project. And I did, at least as far as I'm willing to take it. And here's the final result: new maps of Northern, Central, and Southern California. I also made a few exports from the GIS program I used to determine where to place the boundaries.
In these images, the old borders and county names are in black, the new borders are in red, and the new names are in blue. In the background are major roads in light purple, and national parks in olive.
Gone are all the arbitrary lines laid down when the surveyors divided up the land. The new boundaries mostly follow either watershed divides or major water bodies. There are exceptions, but I tried to limit them as much as possible. The straight lines that you can see here exist because the boundaries I drew are approximations. If this exercise were ever to be repeated for real, almost all of them would go away.
I ended up creating 13 new counties (McCloud, Whiskeytown, Tahoe, Hayward, Livermore, Shaver, Santa Maria, San Fernando, Antelope, Mojave, Palo Verde, Coacella, and Escondido), eliminating 14 (Shasta, Tehama, Glenn, Yuba, Nevada, Placer, Yolo, Amador, Calaveras, Alpine, Contra Costa, Madera, Kings, and Santa Barbara), and renaming 1 that had its signature feature removed (Eagle, from Lassen).
I significantly reshaped nearly every existing county. The two least changed were San Francisco and Orange.
This image shows some of the other layers I used for reference. Watershed outlines are in blue, and population density is represented by shading from light grey to black.
None of the resulting counties are ideal, and several have significant problems. Tulare County, for instance, is larger than I would like, but there is no non-arbitrary way to divide it. McCloud is probably underpopulated (though not any more so than neighboring Modoc). And so on. On the other hand, the most problematic counties have been resolved in one way or another. The minimally populated Alpine County has been eliminated, with the area mostly absorbed by Tahoe. The ridiculously large San Bernardino has been divided between five different counties (though Mojave is still bigger nine states). And Los Angeles is now entirely south of the San Gabriel and Santa Monica Mountains.
If there's a takeaway from this effort, it's that it is a good example of how poorly governed America currently is. There's no reason for the counties of California to exist as they do. They are artifacts of a situation where a literate, industrial culture invaded the lands of a number of pre-literate cultures that had been decimated by disease and warfare. If we were better governed, somebody would have identified obvious problems like the size of San Bernardino, and organized society to resolve them. But for many reasons, nobody has done so. That should be cause for all of us to worry a bit.
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